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I \I l'Ht: SllPREME COURT OF CHE STATE OF UTAH 
1'1'r'" 'ilJRt:WiON, 
' l \ I I l t_ i t f 1 
if' I \1. ALLF:R, JAMES ,T. HILL, 
,,, Ff,l·:IJ A. MORETON & COMPANY, 
,1 1i1 )rpnrat inn, 
'IS. 
Defendants, Third-
Party Plaintiffs and 
Respondents, 
No. 19029 
"\M ,, • '.1 1cCONAGHY, 
fhird-Party Defendant 
and Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
This is •n appeal from a Judgment granting contribution 
tl1ircJ-party defendant, Pam Mcconaghy, who was the host 
'l'l ,f ,, vc,hicle in which the plaintiff was riding as a guest 
,'1· 11 inJiir--·d in ::i. three-car accident 0n 1-15 at the Alpine over-
1•1 !lt-1h Cn11nty. 
DIS PUS I TION IN LOWER COURT 
['1113 1pH1st [Jlaintift, T;immy Sorenson, alleged in her 
1! 11 11 1 1t 1river, Pam Mcconaghy, and two other 
\ll"r rn,1 L3mes J. Hill, 1,.;ere all negligent in 
-1-
on January 30, lYBl. 
JLHige David Dee gr,1nted dPtt,nddr1t- M(_(',irLl,Jh'/' tn11t-_ 1 ,r 1 
summary judgment as against the plaintiff H1 lier ,:,irnpLnnt 
against defendant Mcconaghy hecause of the Utah guest statute bet 
denied defendant McConayhy's motion for dismissal of the cross-
claims nf aames Hill and Aller for contrih11ti•)n. (R. 103-104) 
The case was tried to a Jury with the Honorable Dennis Frederick 
presiding. At the conclusion of the evidence, a motion by 
Mcconaghy for a directed verdict against Hill and Fred A. Moretnn 
& Company was denied. ( R. 228-229) 
The issue of cnmparative negligence was submitted to the 
jury and the jury found 40% negligence on the part of James Hill 
and 60% on Pam Mcconaghy and awarded damages in the sum of 
5114,890.07. ( R. 284-285) 
Steve M. Aller settled with plaintiff just prior to 
trial for the sum of $5,000 and was dismissed out of the case. 
( R. 21 7) Third-party defendant McConaghy's motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict nr in the alternative for a new tri•l 
denied by the court. (R. 228-229) 
Defendants Hill and Moreton & Company satisfied the 
judgment for the sum of sgs,ooo and nhtained a judgment for 
.:ontribution agriinst ·icefc>ndant '1<:(',,naghy E•1r the c;urn nf SS"1, 'illl 
after crF:>ditinq a pnrtinn of the nn f:i.ult p,i.i 1 i t)'/ 
instir::i.nce C>'lrrier r.; t-_hc pl.1int-it-t. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
1i,.t,"n•1ant Mcconaghy seeks reversal of the judgment 
int r1hution, and a Judgment in her favor as a matter of 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Because the issue in this case is one of law and there 
ti rrn ·lispute as to the facts raising that issue, a transcript of 
•hP testimony of the witnesses was not ordered. 
The following facts are undisputed: 
The plaintiff was a student at Brigham Young University 
a11·1 was a guest passenger in the vehicle driven by Pam Mcconaghy 
tr"m Provo toward Salt Lake City on January 30, 1981. The acci-
1cer1l •l<Ccurred on I-15 at the overpass over the Alpine Road in 
·:1. 1\1 Cnunty Cit approximately 5: 55 p.m., when third-party defen-
1,nt .M•:1:onaghy's vehicle traveling in the outside northbound lane 
••nt 1ut of control as it hit ice on the overpass and collided 
.1t''i .o northbound vehicle being driven by Steve Aller in the 
"1t·0 r 1 311P of northbound traffic. McConaghy's vehicle then spun 
int0 the inside northbound lane of traffic where it was struck by 
rr & Company's vehicle being driven by James J. 
Iii LI. 
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PUl NI' l. 
THE fRIC'\I 1'()IJRT IN ;;111iM 11 'l'TN1; '1'111: 
ISSIJC: (Jr' COMP1\Rl\TJVf: 'lr:1;1.11;r:N1'f·, :·r, 1111, 
JUR'r' AND !N Ur:NYl'H; llllkl>-f'.l\l<l'Y llHl.ljlJ,'1IJI 
M·=CONl\GH'r'' S '1UT1'JN f'llk Jll!Jl;Ml:'JT 
nn: Vr:Rll[i'l'. 
fhe Utah guest statutP, Utah C11lie Ann. l-Y-1 ( ig53 I 
prohibits the thiro-party plaintiff in this c3SP frcom any ri•Jht 
of recovery against the host driver, third-party defendant-
appellant. This Court has consistently upheld the validity of 
the Utah guest statute. Critchley v. Vance, 575 P.2d 187 ( lg78); 
Thomas v. Union Pacific Railr0ad C0., 548 P.2d 621 (1976); Cannor· 
v. Oviatt, 520 P.2d 883 (1974); cert. denied 419 U.S. 810; 
rehearing denied 419 U.S. 1060. In Thomas v. Union Pacific 
Railroad Co., supra, this Court stated that "a re-examination 0f 
the (Utah guest statute) should be left to the legislature." 
Thomas at 622-23. In Critchley v. Vance, suprc:, this Court h,,l·J 
that the Utah No-Fault aul:J insur:ance statut•: dnes not make .-, 
t1nst rlriver r)f automobile li3ble f1is guest f.)( 
simpl8 negliger1ce. 
This l, •11rt ·11·-;, r , t ·r··, i ·1 
b11t l1as als0 av0irl.ed Judicial interpretations 
,Jt "S tint '"'>uld have allowed what is expressly for-
111 Statute itself. 
,1,11·1-party plaintiffs, however, seek to have this Court 
1 ,1, r [J" 1 the Utah cont ri hut ion statute, Utah Code Ann. 
,1,;<1 '·" all•)W Ct tortfeasor to obtain a benefit that the tort-
11ctim is specifically prohibited from obtaining by the 
;rr -1 r-t JIJl-?Sf- -;t "1.tute. Other than the dissent in Shonka v. 
1 152 N.W.2c:l 242 (Iowa 1967), Bishop v. Nielson, 632 P.2c:l 
!Utah 1Y81), is the only authority upon which third-party 
,d it nt 1 ffs rely for their contention that a tortfeasor has a 
i"t pit ,,f •:ontribution against a host driver. 
rhe right to contribution among JOint tortfeasors did 
,,,,, -:x1st .1t common law but was created in this state by a 
l"'Jl'olot.1Je '"nactment, Utah Code Ann. §78-27-39 (1973). The 
·:•intribution created by that statute is not a new cause 
lCtl•>n; it is a derivative right that is based on a common 
li1:J1lity t<) r:in inJureti party in tort. See Bishop v. Nielson, 
llnd<?r Utah's contribution statute, a JOint tortfeasor has 
t l Jilt t. 1 contribution from other Joint tortfeasors if he has 
·1 ·· 1, 1r J•"1 the common 11;ibility or more than his pro rata share 
I ' ' I." Ut_ah Code Ann. §78-27-39 (emphasis added). The sta-
1··t 1 ,1 J')int tortf....;1sor 11 as one of two or more persons, 
t for the same in Jury • 
-111( 11 ("mpil.1->t; i•Jd»•il. See Union Pac. 
R.R., 614 P.2rl 1S3, 154 (Utah 1Y80). 
1'1 
c n n t r i h u t i 0 n , 1 t i s r1t? 1_· es s a r y 1 ) ' J e I er m i n e 1.v h ,J t t I 1 f, l , , J i '-> 1 :i t_ 1 r, 
intenrlerl the term ''liAble'' tcJ mean. 
The Utah Supreme C'nurt has r<-;:>ndc,reri dPcisitins 1 , 
which it has discussed the right tn cnntributinn. Alth•)l]gl1 the 
decisions appear to be inconsistent, a careful reading of those 
cases proves otherwise. In Union Pac. R.R., 614 P.2· 
153 (Utah 1980), an action was brought against Union Pacific 
Railroad ("the railroarl"I to recover damages for the death 
plaintiff's husbanrl which occurred when a car in which he was 
riding collided with the railroad's train. The vehicle was 
driven by a fellow employee at the time of the accident. Both 
the decedent, the employee rlriving the vehicle, and their 
employer were residents of North Carolina. The ra i 1 road moved t 
Join the driver and the decedent's employer as third-party defen-
dants, seeking contribution. The trial court dismissed the 
third-party complaint, anrl the Utah Supreme Court affirmed. The 
court's rationale for affirming the trial court, was 
that the Workmen's Compensation Acts of Utah anrl North Carolina 
were the exclusive remerlies Eor actir1ns against an empl!Jyer 111ll 
that the acts an act ion against ll·Yw empl(1yees. Tl-it' 
court 8P.liev(.=rl. that to "lll,1w an act inn t11 he br,)ll(Jht f,1r .._:,;ntr1-
in lhosP. cir-cumst-::i.nces 11 ',.,iould 1nly i11,iir>-='ct-l/ 
l 'It 11 
-1)-
IC: 
614 P.2d at 154. 
11,, lltal1 cnurt then decided Bishop v. Nielson, 632 P.2d 
an apparently inconsistent decision. Bishop 
,H1 act inn to recover clamages for property damage 
,Jtin'J frc)m the collision of automobiles driven by the defen-
1,1'1t ;nd the plaintiff's minor, unemancipatecl daughter. The 
1,,1, 0 11dant 1oinect the plaintiff's minor daughter, seeking contri-
''"Jt i,1n. The daughter moved to clismiss the third-party complaint 
1n the ground that she was not a joint tortfeasor within the 
meaning of the contribution statute because the doctrine of 
,l1r>or1t-chilc1 immunity shielded her from liability to her father. 
trial court denied the motion, and the Utah Supreme Court 
''fJht!ld that <lenial, finding that "the equities in favor of 
rif)uti0n far outweigh[ed] the benefits to be achieved 
1 strict application of the doctrine." 632 P.2d at 868. In 
rP,1chin'J its decision, the court quoteci extensively from 
1p,_-1si,-ins in other JUrisciictions that supported its conclusion 
1 'nt t lie c1octrine of parent-child immunity did not bar an action 
t 'r 1 )11trihution. Even though that decision seems at o<lds with 
t ''µ ,-n,Jrt 's decision in Phillips, the following language which 
''1,, 1,11 111 court quote1i rnay provide a key to why the result in 
1s c1ifferent than the result in Phillips: 
With respect to the cioctrine forbiclding 
inerspl)L1Sr=il suits in this state, it is 
·:lear tf1at ca11se of action exists which 
cannnt . We agree with 
tit"' pla1nt1>t's statement that the term 
1i1tJle refers tci the existence of a 
-7-
C,"l.llSe r)f ,11·\ i 1 >n r it li•'r I !ll ' 
•-' n f ) r,, i:TJ• ] I '\ 1 I I i I , I > ' l 
-.i_l•liJS•' l •ITI 11 JI 
-:-(;, 111-t_ i L. 
032 P.2rl at 8()7 (cit1t1 1 )r1c.:, Jrn1i-1,'.1\ 1.''ntil11,1-; ir1 
court staterl: 
arising betgweeen parent dn<rl <:hi lcl tiut '>nly 0perate<i .;s ,, 
dural bar to such act inns." 632 P.2rl at Hh7 (emphasis in 
ori<Jinal). 
The Utab court's latest discussi<Hl of the ri,Jht Ui 
contributi11n amnng JOint tnrtfeasors, Madsen v. Salt Lake 
School Boarrl, 645 P.2rl 658 at hfi2, flies in the face <lf the 
Bishop case but lends support to Phillips anrl the app•>llant's 
position in this case. 
w0uld ciot be <cJi·;en the weight that is acc<irrle<i the anrl 
ri(;Jht trJ cont i•Jn as N•--,en 
JOint tcJrt-feasnrc; has 8ePr1 
t)ef0rf-'1 the courts. In co11si1ier1n(J tt1at 
ri(Jht c0urts ::i.ppc•::i.r t1; ratfier uni-
f1;rml·/ t:tken tht? p(;sit1nn t_\1.::i.t r )r tht--, 
right (1f cr;ntribution to exist d.rnring 
JrJint t·)rt-f·?asr)rS, it- is 1_•'--JSt-?nt-1:::il tt·1_1t-
'.l1)th tl!rt-f·..?.._1snrs he 113.tJlf" t')r 1nd 
JCCt t() suit hy the party inJur,_,•i hy t 1lt-' 
J (Ji n t neg 1 i 1J (, n t :1 ct s 'if '""" 1 ch • us ·,..,; lf_' re 
c. u i t :i iJ 3 i n r , 'n e -Jf t_J\,--. r 1rt-f,• lLS :J J ') 
;)drr.-:d ,ryy ,1 iJuest_ )r .l/ -i. 
t,1l r·'---,L"l.ti•'nship t-_n lll]llrt _ ,,j ti1rt 'r 
',IJ,)rV.m,•n' :--.; lffip\;11s,1t l •n 11.-;'- 1 1( 
ri1jht r) 1'')r1tr1;J11t 1 111 fr- irn J,' l'it 
''<. 1 \ 
-8-
l t h h 2. 
''i'"l lant rea<h those decisions from the Utah Supreme 
1 llJl d distinction between substance and pro-
i "" ,,f,,·n determining whether a right of contribution exists. 
rlr» pl1intiff has ci cause of action, either enforceable or 
,1·1,,11t Jrl:t-!rlhle, against a person, that person is "liable in tort, 11 
is t!1at t"'rrn is used in the contribution statute, and may be sued 
l l r ·= 1) n t rib u t i 0 n . However, if no cause of action exists cigainst 
, person, he is not "liable in tort" and therefore may 
"'' he sued for contribution. 
In the Bishop case contribution was allowed because the 
µL•intiff had a cause of action against the third-party defendant 
,,,,t it criuldn' t be enforced. This would not preclude defendant's 
.l .im f·Jr ·:ontributi•)n. However, in the Phillips case the plain-
•1tt had no cause rif action against the third-party defendant 
'l'lC<e 1t hci<I been eliminated by the legislature when the 
1.V,ir',_men' s Compensation Act ·was enacted. The same holds true 
,,,., The> lcegislnture by enacting the guest statute eliminated, 
··«···pt in certain circumstances, plaintiff's cause of action 
·Jn ·1st the thi rrJ-party rJefendant. Therefore, contribution is 
111i l 1cil<e tri the third-party plaintiff. 
CONCLUSION 
p,,., ip[wllant is -convinced that the Utah automobile 
11 1t- 11"->! t. !/'-> the s11hst·-1ntive right t0 bring a cause of 
r1•)t 1 pr"lceciural har to an action. Tfius, 
-')-
under- Utah 13.'W, l.n a('t ir1n []\.!'/ r1 ,\ 
l ii•' 1'1• 
under the guest statute. 'J\> 
done indir-ectly tt1at th!-:" l.Jt 11r-I-:" l1as ,Jet•:-rrni nPd 1.-:ann(Jt 
ne done dir-ectly, a r-esult that ·wnuld cir,:umvP.nt 
legislative policy. Shonka v. Campbcdl, 152 N.W.Ld 242, 
(Iowa 1967). 
Respectfully submitted this day Gf ,June, 1Y83. 
By 
STRONG & HANNI 
LAWRENCE L. SUMMERHAYS 
Attorney for Third-Party 
Defendant-Appellant 
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